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Note
Putting Teeth Into Minnesota's Employment
Discrimination Law: A Legislative Proposal
Defining Gender Stereotyping
Kari Aamot-Snapp
Stereotypes, like laws, usually persist even after the realities have
changed.'
As employers become more sophisticated in masking their discriminathe [law] become more sophisticated in crafttory motives, so too must
2
ing tests to detect it.

The work world has changed considerably since employers
felt free to tell women 3 they would not be hired for "men's jobs."4
CAROL TAvars & CAROLE OFFEm, THE LONGEST WAR: SEx DIFFERENCES
20 (1977).
2. J. Cindy Eson, Casenote, In Praiseof Macho Women: Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 46 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 835, 854 (1992).
3. This Note focuses exclusively on discriminatory employer decision
making based on gender stereotyping. Because employer stereotyping based on
gender overwhelmingly penalizes women, this Note will refer to the plaintiff as
"she" throughout. See Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of
Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 494 (1990) (citing various
studies of common gender stereotypes). According to research, "women who exhibit[ ] a high degree of 'feminine' traits ... tend[ I to be far less successful in
their careers than those women who exhibit[ I a balance of 'nasculine' and feminine' traits, or in whom the 'masculine' traits predominate( I." Id. at 496-97.
See generally MARGARET L. ANDERSEN, THINKING ABouT WOMEN: SOCIOLOGICAL
PERsPECTIVES ON SEx AND GENDER 101-39 (1994) (discussing social myths about
1.

I

PERSPECTIVE

women's work that influence women's role in economic life);

HARRIET BRADLEY,

MENes WORK, WOMEN's WoRc A SOCIOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE SEXuAL DMSION OF LABOUR IN EMPLOYMENT (1989) (discussing gender segregation and sexA. FERBER, THm ECONOMICS OF
typing of jobs); FRANcnE D. BLAu & MAIA
WOMEN, MEN AN WORK (1986) (discussing traditional economic theory and

traditional women's occupations and their impact on the status of women); infra note 83 (listing various gender stereotypes particularly relevant to work
performance).
4. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, a case decided twelve years ago, provides an
example of blatant sexism. 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982) (class action suit
alleging employment discrimination on basis of sex in county sheriff's department). Defendant, Sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia, when asked whether he
was prejudiced against women, replied, "I will say I don't want a woman workIt is not discrimination but I got good
ing and I give them the reason ....
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Unfortunately, the extinction of baldly expressed sexism has not
meant the extinction of gender bias in the work place.5 Certain
forms of bias, most commonly gender stereotyping,6 occur even
in the absence of explicit reference to gender. Many employers
still make gender-based decisions, particularly concerning high
level promotions, but they cite "neutral" reasons for their decisions.7 The job no longer requires a man, per se, but it "requires" aggressiveness, detachment, firm leadership, singleminded commitment, even ruthlessness-traits that employers
consistently find lacking in female candidates. 8 At the same
time, employers find aggressive, detached or ruthless female
employees distastefully unfeminine, abrasive or overbearing. 9
Thus employers trap female professionals in a "double bind,"
judging them incompetent if they act like women and labeling
them "difficult," or worse, if they act like men.1 0
reason for the way I am thinking... I know I wouldn't want my daughter or
my wife to hold that kind of job." Id. at 1371 n.20.
5. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW 161 (1989) ("Women have more opportunities for economic independence than ever before in history, but certain obstacles persist .... Most female
employees.., have remained in relatively low-status, low-paying, female-dominated vocations."); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition II: Price
Waterhouse and the IndividualEmployment DiscriminationCase, 42 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1023, 1026 (1990) ("There remain employers who have been impervious
to legal pressures generated over twenty-five years to improve opportunities for
minorities and women.").
6. For an excellent discussion and definition of "the stereotyping process"
in the work place, see Radford, supra note 3, at 489-503; see also infra part HAB (describing gender stereotyping in employment).
7. Marina 0. Szteinbok, Indirect Proofof DiscriminatoryMotive in Title
VII DisparateTreatment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1114
(1988) ("An employer who discriminates will seldom display prejudice blatantly."); Susan Struth, Note, Permissible Sexual Stereotyping Versus Impermissible Sexual Stereotyping: A Theory of Causation, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
679, 695 (1989) ("[A discriminatory] employer's records often will not contain
arguably gender-biased comments made by the decision makers. . ").
8. See Maxine N. Eichner, Note, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's
Work: Challenging Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE
L.J. 1397, 1401-02 (1988) ("Large numbers of traditionally male jobs in our society are mischaracterized as requiring traits predominantly associated with
men.").
9. See generally Radford, supra note 3 (discussing employers' attribution
of these traits to female employees). The female worker "will not succeed... if
she is too 'masculine' ... because she will be perceived as engaging in deviant
behavior unbecoming to her gender." Id. at 503.
10. See id. at 500-03 (explaining that women with "female" or "male" attributes are discriminated against). Unable to win the employer acceptance
crucial to advancement, large numbers of female employees collect in the lower
levels of virtually every employment field. See Eichner, supra note 8, at 1404
(discussing the "double bind"); see also infra part H.B (explaining the "double
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Minnesota has been a pacesetter in the protection of employee civil rights," but that position is slipping. Federal and
various state courts have expressly addressed and prohibited
gender stereotyping in employer decision making. 12 Minnesota,
by contrast, continues to use an employment discrimination
framework that has not materially changed in two decades.' 3
The framework contains no language about gender stereotyping
and cannot facilitate an effective examination of complex, controversial stereotyping claims. 14
This Note asserts that a legislative amendment to the Mdinnesota Human Rights Act defining illegal gender stereotyping
would help Minnesota courts recognize and penalize such stereotyping in claims brought under Minnesota's current discrimination framework. Part I describes Minnesota's framework,
making relevant comparisons to federal employment discrimination law. Part II describes the growing prevalence of gender
stereotyping in the work place, explains the gender stereotyping
process, and analyzes the insensitivity of current Minnesota law
and federal law to such stereotyping. Part III suggests that a
legislative definition of illegal stereotyping would assist litigants
bind"). See generally JoHN E. WLi~As & DEBORAH L. BEST, MEASURING SEX
STEREOTYPES: A MULTINATION STUDY 294 (1990) ("It appears that, in the
United States, the sex stereotypes create a barrier whenever persons of one sex
seek entry into an occupation that has traditionally been occupied primarily by
members of the other se."); Struth, supra note 7, at 679 (i[W]omen are still
experiencing barriers to equal employment opportunity. These barriers, in
part, are a result of persons continuing to associate particular personality characteristics with each of the sexes, thereby perpetuating discrimination in the
workplace.").
11. "Minnesota has a long history of civil rights legislation and protection
for groups beyond that afforded by federal law." Carlson v. Independent Sch.
Dist. No. 623, 392 N.W.2d 216, 221 (Minn. 1986) (en banc).
12. See infra part I.B (describing federal law addressing stereotyping); note
62 (listing stereotype decisions in federal and other state courts).
13. Minnesota uses an employment discrimination framework created in
1973. See infra part I.B (describing the framework).
14. See infra part H.C (analyzing the limitations of the Minnesota framework in stereotype cases). The framework's inadequacy discourages victims of
stereotype-based gender discrimination from bringing claims, shielding discriminatory employers from liability. MINNESOTA SuPREFm, COURT TASK FORCE
FOR GENDER FArRNESS IN THE CoURTs FINAL REPORT 81 (1989) [hereinafter GENDER FAINEss REPORT] (reporting that most Minnesota women who bring employment discrimination claims do not take their cases to state court).
Additionally, research reveals that only three Minnesota employment discrimination cases mention the word "stereotyping", even in passing. See Hengesteg
v. Ecolab, Inc., No. C1-91-2156, 1992 WL 89647, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 5,
1992); Beaulieu v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Ridler
v. Olivia Pub. Sch. Sys. No. 653, 432 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); see
also infra note 58 (discussing these cases).
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and judges to more effectively analyze stereotype claims. This
Note urges Minnesota to reestablish leadership in employment
discrimination jurisprudence by breaking its silence on this issue and moving beyond the federal treatment of gender stereotyping to a more vigilant prohibition of this pervasive form of
bias.
I.

DISPARATE TREATMENT EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPLEX AND
EVOLVING

A. THE MINNESOTA HumAN

RIGHTS ACT:

A "BROAD

REMEDIAL

15

PURPOSE"

Legislation provides the platform for all employment discrimination case law. At the federal level, Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment.1 6 The
Minnesota Human Rights Act, enacted in 1955, made employment discrimination illegal on the state level.' 7 Section 363.03
of the Minnesota Act makes it an unfair and illegal employment
otherpractice for an employer to refuse to hire, discharge, 1or
8
sex.
of
because
employee
an
against
discriminate
wise
In entrusting Minnesota courts with interpretation of the
Act, the legislature cautioned against "narrowly construing" any
of the statute's provisions. 19 It emphasized the Act's "broad remedial purpose" 20 of "secur[ing] for persons in this state[ ] freedom from discrimination." 2 1 As plaintiffs brought cases under
the Minnesota Act, Minnesota courts searched for a litigation
framework to organize judicial analysis and effectively implement the Act's goals. Noting the remarkable similarity between
15. Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626
(Minn. 1988) (en banc).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
17. MIN. STAT. § 363.03 (Supp. 1993).
18. Id., subd. 1(2). The statute also prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of "race, color, creed, religion, national origin, ... marital status,
status with regard to public assistance, membership or activity in a local commission, disability, sexual orientation, or age." Id.
19. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1981)
(en banc) (discussing legislative intent underlying the Minnesota Act). See
MuNm. STAT. § 363.11 ("The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof.").
20. Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626
(Minn. 1988) (en banc) (discussing legislative intent).
21. MINN.STAT. § 363.12.
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the Minnesota statute and Title VII, 22 the Minnesota Supreme

Court adopted the federal framework for Minnesota employment
23
discrimination litigation.

B.

MINNESOTA'S FRAMEwORK: THE THREE-STEP "PRETEXT"
ANALYSis

In the complex arena of employment discrimination law,
courts examine allegedly discriminatory employment practices
under different schemes depending on the particular facts of
each case. 2 4 If an employer practice or procedure impacts a certain protected class 2 5 disparately, the case receives a "disparate
impact" analysis. 2 6 If an employer treats individual members of
a protected group disparately, as they do when they apply gender stereotypes to employees, the case requires "disparate treat22. Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. 1978) (en banc). Title
VII declares that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-l)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
23. Danz, 263 N.W.2d at 398-99 ("This court has applied principles developed in court decisions under Title VII for purposes of construing [the Minnesota Human Rights Act].").
24. The development of federal law, which parallels the development of
most state law, has been continuous since Title VII was passed in 1964. See
generally MARK A. Roms=aN ET AL., CAsEs AND MATERiALS ON EmpLyEnTr
LAw 234-59 (1991) (tracing the evolution of employment discrimination law).
In early years, courts assumed plaintiffs would have direct evidence of their
employer's discrimination. As it became clear that such direct evidence was
rare and becoming rarer, the United States Supreme Court created different
frameworks for plaintiffs relying on circumstantial evidence. See id.; see also
Radford, supra note 3, at 508 ("The manner in which disparate treatment cases
are adjudicated has evolved as the courts, litigants and attorneys have become
more sophisticated in dealing with employment decisions.").
25. For discussions of"protected class," see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
10 (1967) (containing one of the Supreme Court's earliest articulations of "protected class"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (referring to
the traditionally protected classes: "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and natural origin are inherently suspect").
See also supra note 18 (listing the protected classes under Minnesota law, in
addition to gender).
26. See generally RoTHTsEIN, supra note 24, at 234-59 (citing cases). Disparate impact discrimination occurs when an employer subjects its employees
to a facially neutral selection process that in practice has an adverse effect on
the employment opportunities of a "protected class." Id. at 248. Disparate impact plaintiffs must introduce statistical evidence of discrimination, and case
law focuses on this requisite showing. Id.
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ment" analysis.2 7 In disparate treatment claims, courts must
establish whether the employer acted with discriminatory intent,28 a requirement that adds complexity and subjectivity to
disparate treatment litigation.
Minnesota courts consider disparate treatment claims
under a three-step framework2 9 created in the 1973 United
30
States Supreme Court case McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.
At the framework's first stage, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination 3 ' by showing that she belongs
to a "protected class," 3 2 that she was qualified for, applied for,
and was rejected from a position or promotion,3 3 and that her
27. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977) (distinguishing "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact").
Disparate treatment discrimination occurs when an individual employee suffers
the impact of an adverse employment decision made by an employer motivated
by "illegitimate factors," as defined by Title VII. RoTHSrn, supra note 24, at
234.
28. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (explaining that unlike disparate
impact claims, [p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical" for disparate treatment claims).
29. See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 62324 (Minn. 1988) (en banc) (describing the framework). The framework has
three stages-each a "shift in the burden of proof-designed to arrange complex issues within disparate treatment claims for efficient judicial examination.
Id. Cf Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981) (stating the federal Supreme Court's description of the framework's
stages). "The McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens
serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to th[e] ultimate question of intentional discrimination." Id. at 253.
30. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Minnesota adopted the McDonnell Douglas
framework in 1978 and has used it exclusively for 16 years. See Danz v. Jones,
263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. 1978) (en banc) (discussing suitability of McDonnell Douglas framework); see also McGrath v. TOF Bank Say., 509 N.W.2d
365, 366 (Minn. 1993) (en bane) (clarifying the McDonnell Douglas method of
proof); Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623 (describing the framework); Hubbard v.
United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 441-42 (Minn. 1983) (en bane) (applying
McDonnell Douglas to a retaliatory discharge claim).
31. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
32. See MiNN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (listing as "protected classes"
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act race, color, creed, religion, national
origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, disability,
and age).
33. Although disparate treatment employment discrimination cases most
often involve an employment decision to terminate or refuse to promote an employee, the range of employment decisions subject to review under the Minnesota Human Rights Act or Title VII is very broad. As the Court explained in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, for example, "the language of Title VII is not
limited to economic or tangible discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment." 477
U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting City of Los Angeles Dep't ofWater & Power v. Man-
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to consider similarly qualified candidates afemployer continued
34
rejection.
her
ter
Successful establishment of a prima facie case raises a presumption of discrimination that the employer, in the second
phase of the McDonnell Douglasframework, must rebut to avoid
liability.3 5 The employer may overcome the presumption of disreason" for its adverse
cimination by articulating a "legitimate
36
decision concerning the employee.
If the employer meets its rebuttal burden, the plaintiff proceeds in one of two ways: either by convincing the fact finder
that the employer's proffered reason was a mere "pretext" 37 for
38
discrimination, or by offering direct evidence of discrimination.
Thus, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, plaintiffs may
demonstrate discrimination by proving that "the reason advanced by [the employer] was 'pretextural' [sic] or that the 'discriminatory reason' more likely than not motivated" the
employer's decision. 3 9 Either showing entitles her to a finding of
hart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (citation omitted), cert. grantedand vacated, 461 U.S.
951 (1983)).
34. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802

(outlining the requirements of a plaintiff's prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework).
35. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623; McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802.
36. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If

the employer meets this burden, the case advances to the third and most substantive step of the McDonnell Douglas test. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623-24;
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.

37. The Supreme Coures original articulation of the McDonnell Douglas
test contains an explanation of this term:
Title VII does not... permit [an employer] to use [an employee's] conduct as a pretext for [prohibited] discrimination .... [The plaintiff]
must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent
evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in
fact a cover up for a... discriminatory decision.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
38. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623-24; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.

39. See Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 627. Because directly persuading the
court that discrimination occurred is so often difficult, the McDonnell Douglas
test ostensibly gives the plaintiff an important advantage by allowing her to
disprove her employer's proffered reason. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981) ("[Pllacing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves... to frame the factual issue with sufficient
clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext.").
The federal courts' articulation of this burden was, until recently, very similar: the plaintiff could prevail "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. A 1993 Supreme Court decision, however, altered the
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liability.40
C.

MINNESOTA'S REJECTION OF A "MIXED MOTIVE" ANALYSIS

Minnesota still uses McDonnell Douglas exclusively in disparate treatment cases. 4 1 Federal courts, by contrast, use two
frameworks. In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins4 2 that McDonnell Douglas could
not appropriately serve all federal cases of disparate treatment
employment discrimination. 43 The "pretext" framework, explained the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion, assumes that a
discriminatory employer always has a single illegitimate motive,
which it attempts to cover up by concocting a single facially legitimate motive. 4 Employers, however, often act upon "a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives." 45 Thus, the Price
federal interpretation somewhat. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742 (1993) (en banc). In language that seems to directly contradict McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine, Justice Scalia wrote for a five-justice majority that an
employment discrimination plaintiff is not entitled to a directed verdict in a
disparate treatment case merely by demonstrating that her employer's proffered reason was unbelievable. Id. at 2751-52. Instead, she must go on to
demonstrate that the employer's reason was discriminatory. Id. In short,
Hicks rejected the Burdine interpretation that McDonnell Douglas requires
either a direct showing of discrimination or a showing of pretext. Id. at 2752.
Instead, Hicks held that McDonnell Douglas requires both, at least in some
cases. Id.
Although Hicks stops short of dismantling McDonnell Douglas, it does, to
an extent that is presently unclear, weaken the previously powerful consequences of a pretext showing in a disparate treatment case. See David S. Tatel
et al., Commentary, The 1992-93 Term of the United States Supreme Court and
its Impact on Public Schools, 85 EDUC. L. REP. 397 (1993) (explaining impact of
Hicks on plaintiff's burden of proof). Whether the Minnesota Supreme Court
ought to follow Hicks's lead or distance itself from the federal decision is a question beyond the scope of this Note. If the Minnesota Supreme Court has made
any indication of its inclination, the indication is that Minnesota will not follow
Hicks. See McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993) (en
banc) (holding that although a showing of pretext was one way of ensuring a
plaintiff's victory in a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff may also prevail
"if an illegitimate reason 'more likely than no motivated the... decision")
(citing Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 627).
40. But see supra note 39 (discussing Hicks).
41. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the McDonnell
Douglasthree-step framework); see also infra note 55 (discussing application of
McDonnell Douglas to disparate treatment claims).
42. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 247.
44. Id. The Price Waterhouse Court noted that, "the premise of [the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine "pretext" analysis] is that either a legitimate or an
illegitimate set of considerations led to the challenged decision." Id.
45. Id. In such cases, according to the Court, the "pretext" analysis becomes inappropriate because "it simply makes no sense to ask whether [a] legit-
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Waterhouse Court supplemented the "pretext" test with a second
disparate treatment framework specially designed for "mixed
46
motive" employment decisions.
Although Price Waterhouse focuses on the debate between
"mixed" and "single motive" decisions, the case is equally important because it is the first 47 United States Supreme Court decision to extensively discuss employment discrimination in the
form of gender stereotyping. 48 Price Waterhouse plaintiff Ann
Hopkins offered evidence that decision makers at the Price
Waterhouse accounting firm denied her partnership because
they found her too "macho"49 and thought she should "'walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.'- 50 In
upholding Hopkins' discrimination charge, the Supreme Court
stated, "In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer
who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."5 1
Many commentators, in part because of its ground breaking
imate reason" is the true reason. Id. Deciding Price Waterhouse as a "pretext"
case would "insist that [the McDonnell Douglas] framework perform work that
it was never intended to perform." Id. at 247.
46. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246-47. Subsequent legislative action
altered Price Waterhouse's holding somewhat. The 1991 Civil Rights Act
shifted the employer's burden of showing it would have made the same employment decision, regardless of an employee's gender, from the liability to the damages phase of a lawsuit. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
47. Research reveals that no Supreme Court cases before Price Waterhouse
comprehensively address gender stereotyping by employers. See Tracy L. Bach,
Note, Gender Stereotyping in Employment Discrimination: Finding a Balance
of Evidence and Causation Under Title VII, 77 MnN. L. REv. 1251, 1264 (1993)
(noting the significance of Price Waterhouse because "[f]or the first time, the
Supreme Court explicitly discussed gender stereotyping"). But see Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) ("It is impermissible under Title VII to
refuse to hire... on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.");
City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(making passing but undeveloped declarations against discrimination in the
form of stereotyping).
48. "As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group." Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 251.
49. Id. at 235.
50. Id. (citing Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117
(D.D.C. 1985)). Hopkins introduced further evidence of employer statements
that she was "a lady using foul language" and that she "overcompensated for
being a woman." Id.
51. Id. at 250.

220

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:211

discussion of stereotyping, praised Price Waterhouse as a significant step for employment discrimination plaintiffs. 5 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, opined that the Price
Waterhouse "mixed motive" framework might actually disadvantage employment discrimination plaintiffs. 53 Minnesota therefore declined to adopt the federal framework 54 and continues to
litigate all disparate treatment claims under McDonnell
55
Douglas.

52. See, e.g., Bach, supra note 47, at 1264 ("The Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse changed the landscape of employment discrimination cases involving gender stereotyping... [by] finding that stereotyping provides evidence of
discrimination."). See generally Peter Brandon Bayer, Patterson and Civil
Rights: What Rough Beast Slouches TowardsBethlehem to be Born?, 21 COLUM.

HUM. RTs. L. REv. 401, 452 (1990) ("Hopkins is the one decision of the October
1988 term enforcing a broad interpretation of a civil rights law."); William B.
Gould, IV, The Supreme Court and Employment DiscriminationLaw in 1989:
JudicialRetreat and CongressionalResponse, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1485, 1499 (1990)

("PriceWaterhouse [was] a decision widely heralded as a major victory for plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases .... ."); Cassandra Butts et al., Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and Legislative Response: The 1988
Supreme Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 475, 531 (1990) ("The Price Waterhouse decision represented a significant,

though mixed, victory for civil rights plaintiffs."); Cheryl A. Pilate, Comment,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Mixed Outcome for Title VII Mixed-Motive

Plaintiffs, 38 KAN. L. Rlv. 107, 108 (1989) ("Amid the rapid razing of established civil rights law, one case, PriceWaterhouse v. Hopkins, emerged as a lone
victory [for employment discrimination plaintiffs].").
53. Shortly before Price Waterhouse was decided, the Minnesota Supreme
Court heard a similar case and rejected the "mixed motive" analysis. See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 627 (Minn. 1988) (en
banc). The Anderson court stated that the "same decision" element of the mixed
motive framework, which allowed defendants "definitionally guilty" of discrimination to escape liability, "would defeat the broad remedial purposes of the Minnesota Human Rights Act." Id. at 626.
54. Although the problems with the Price Waterhouse "mixed motive"
framework that the Minnesota Supreme Court diagnosed were arguably corrected at the federal level by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, see supra note 46, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has not reconsidered adopting a mixed motive
framework.
55. See Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 626-27 ("Courts of this state should continue to apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis in employment cases involving
claims of disparate treatment brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
regardless of whether a claim has the label of being a 'single-motive' or 'mixedmotive' case."). See also McGrath v. TCF Bank Say., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366
(Minn. 1993) (en banc) (applying McDonnell Douglas); Sigurdson v. Isanti
County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. 1986) (en banc) (same); Hubbard v. United
Press Intl, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 441-42 (Minn. 1983) (en banc) (same).
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II. MINNESOTA AND FEDERAL DISPARATE
TREATMENT LAW: INEFFECTIVE IN
STEREOTYPE CASES
Minnesota's rejection of Price Waterhouse's framework is
not in itself problematic. 5 6 What is disturbing is Minnesota's
failure to articulate a prohibition of sex stereotyping, like that in
Price Waterhouse, within its preferred McDonnell Douglasjurisprudence, or to address stereotyping anywhere in its case law.
Minnesota courts have cited McDonnell Douglas in more
than 100 cases. 5 7 None contains a sustained discussion of gender stereotyping in the work place. 58 This suggests either that
Minnesota plaintiffs are not bringing stereotype cases,5 9 or that
discussing the stereoMinnesota judges are not recognizing and
60
type issues that do come before them.
The lack of judicial discussion of stereotyping is especially
troubling given Minnesota's established leadership in civil
rights law.6 1 Currently, Minnesota lags behind federal courts in
56. For a discussion of Price Waterhouse's limitations as a stereotyping

case, see infra part II.D. But see McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., 502 N.W.2d 801,
807 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (alluding to possible benefits to Minnesota case
law of a Price Waterhouse "mixed-motive" analysis).
57. Research shows that the federal McDonnell Douglas decision is cited in
123 Minnesota cases. Search of Westlaw, MN-CS database (July 9, 1994).
58. Of the 123 Minnesota cases citing McDonnell Douglas, only three mention the word stereotyping, one time each. Search of Westlaw, MN-CS database
(July 9, 1994); see Hengesteg v. Ecolab, Inc., No. C1-91-2156, 1992 WL 89647,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 5, 1992) (plaintiff who offered evidence that her employer stereotyped her as "dependent" lost a disparate treatment challenge
under McDonnell Douglas);Beaulieu v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992) (mentioning "stereotypes" ofAIDS victims in discrimination case
against a dentist); Ridler v. Olivia Pub. Sch. Sys. No. 653, 432 N.W.2d 777, 783
(Minn. 1988) (citing a federal court's statement mentioning stereotyping to support its holding that men as well as women could sue under Title VII and the
Minnesota Human Rights Act). None of these opinions contains sustained discussion of gender stereotyping in employment decisions, or a definition of illegal
gender stereotyping.
59. Indeed, a study of the subject revealed that Minnesota plaintiffs do
avoid state court, and may avoid litigation altogether, when they experience
gender-based discrimination. See GENDER FAnRNEss REPORT, supra note 14, at
81 ("Most employment discrimination cases [in Minnesota] are handled in federal court .... This low number of cases in state courts... could indicate either
the reluctance of victims to seek legal redress or a preference for other forums."). Furthermore, the study reports, "fewer than one-quarter of the state's
judges have handled gender-based employment discrimination cases in state
court within the last two years (1986-1988)." Id.
60. See infra part II.E.1 (analyzing judicial insensitivity to stereotyping
issues).

61. "The scope of discrimination liability, and its consequences, is more onerous under our state laws than under Title VII." Carlson v. Independent Sch.
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redressing gender stereotyping, and behind the many states
that have incorporated Price Waterhouse's explicit prohibition
against stereotyping into their employment discrimination case
law. 62 To regain its position as a pioneer in this area, Minnesota
must go beyond the ultimately unsatisfying Price Waterhouse
language to a more effective proscription of employment discrimination based on gender stereotyping.

Dist. No. 623, 392 N.W.2d 216, 221 (Minn. 1986) (en banc). See also United
States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Minn. 1981) (en banc) (noting, in reference to the legislative history of employment discrimination prohibition in the Minnesota Human Rights Act, that the Minnesota legislature
extended "full and equal privileges" to "all persons within the jurisdiction of the
state of Minnesota" fully "ten years before the United States Supreme Court
[reversed] the 'separate but equal' fiction justifying the Jim Crow laws").
62. Federal courts have addressed the illegality of stereotyping while Minnesota courts have not. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
240, 251 (1988) ("We take [Title VII] to mean that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions.... [W]e are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group .... ."); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987) ("A statute based on such stereotypical assumptions
would, of course, be inconsistent with Title VIrs goal of equal employment opportunity."); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 n.13 (1978) ("'In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.'") (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977)
("But whatever the verbal formulation, the federal courts have agreed that it is
impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on
the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes."). Federal courts' more
explicit treatment of stereotyping may explain why most Minnesota disparate
treatment cases are tried in federal, not state, court. GENDER FAnEss REPORT, supra note 14, at 81.
Other states, unlike Minnesota, have adopted Price Waterhouse and its prohibition of stereotyping into their disparate treatment jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Levey v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, No. 1-90-1121, 1993 WL
53790, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 1993) (citing Price Waterhouse for support in declaring gender stereotyping "wholly illegitimate"); Montana Rail Link
v. Byard, 860 P.2d 121, 127 (Mont. 1993) (citing Price Waterhouse as authority
for allowing expert testimony on gender stereotyping); Robb v. Ridgewood Bd. of
Educ., 635 A.2d 586, 593 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (applying Price
Waterhouse "theory" of stereotyping); Graff v. Eaton, 598 A.2d 1383, 1384-86
(Vt. 1991) (citing PriceWaterhouse for support in holding that evidence of heavy
reliance on stereotypes enables the discrimination plaintiff to meet her burden
of proof); Behrmann v. Phototron Corp., 795 P.2d 1015, 1018-19 (N.M. 1990)
(holding that lower court correctly gave a "PriceWaterhouse stereotype instruction" to the jury).
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THE CHANGING COMPLEXION OF EMPLOYER
DISCRIMINATION: STEREOTYPING GROWS PREVALENT AS
BLATANT DISCREMNATION BEcOMs TABOO

Regardless of the framework used, employment discrimination law will be ineffective today unless judges and lawyers recognize and penalize gender stereotyping when it surfaces in
discrimination claims. For a combination of reasons, stereotypeinfused decision-making is becoming the most common form of
employment discrimination against women. As a result, it is the
central issue in most gender-based disparate treatment claims.
At the time McDonnell Douglas was decided, women were
fighting employment discrimination to simply attain jobs. 6 3 Discrimination plaintiffs were not challenging the belief that they
could not perform certain jobs well; rather, they were fighting
for the right to work in certain jobs at all.64 Employers were
resisting the presence of a woman anywhere in the office, not
just the presence of women as partners and company
65
presidents.
Today, by contrast, the numbers of women and men in the
work force are nearly equal. 66 Employment discrimination,
however, has not disappeared. It has merely crept up the career
ladder.6 7 Below the infamous "glass ceiling," 68 women now have
relatively equal employment opportunities, but the upper eche63. Radford, supra note 3, at 481-82, 515 n.198 ("At the time Title VII was
passed, a job advertisement which noted that 'women need not apply' was not
uncommon.").

64. Id.; see also Anta Cava, Taking JudicialNotice of Sexual Stereotyping,
43 ARK. L. R-v. 27, 55 (1990) ("[Elnforcement of Title VII is moving into a second generation of lawsuit, one that challenges decision making by professionals
about professionals").
65. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969) (holding that the job of "switch-man" must be held open to women as well
as men).
66. See JONI SEAGER & ANN OLSON, WOMEN IN THE WoRLD: AN INTERNATIONAL ATLAS 16 (1986) (reporting women constitute nearly half the paid labor
force in America). See also VmGn-IA SAPIRO, WOMEN IN AmERiCAN SocmrY 378

(1989) (reporting that by 1986, women comprised forty percent of the work
force).
67. See Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 1026 ("We are less racist and sexist
than we were twenty-five years ago... [yet] there remain employers who have
been impervious to legal pressures . . . to improve opportunities for . . .
women.").
68. "Glass ceiling" is a popular term for what social scientists call "hierarchical" or "vertical segregation," which means the confinement of women to
lower paying, lower prestige positions within given fields. See generally BLAu &
FERBER, supra note 3, at 161-63 (discussing hierarchical segregation within
university facilities); Elanor Lyon, The Economics of Gender, in SEx RoLES AND
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Ions of most fields are still overwhelmingly populated by men, 69
and several particularly prestigious or well paying professions
70
remain largely or entirely closed to women.
Consequently, today's discrimination plaintiffs bring fewer
SoCIAL PATTERNS 174-77 (Francis A. Bodreau et al., eds. 1986) (discussing barriers to upward occupational mobility).
69. See Radford, supra note 3, at 490-93 (explaining the concentrations of
women in lower paying, less powerful or less prestigious work); RHODE, supra
note 5, at 161 ("Women have more opportunities for economic independence
than ever before in history, but certain obstacles persist .... Most female employees ... have remained in relatively low-status, low-paying, female-dominated vocations."); see also BLAu & FERBER, supranote 3, at 153 ("[W]omen who
have succeeded in reaching the highest levels in business, unions, government,
or academia are still extremely rare."); ANDERSEN, supra note 3, at 119
("[W]ithin the professions, women are concentrated in the lower ranks and in
less prestigious specialties."); Lyon, supra note 68, at 169 ("The female sector of
the labor market.., is predominantly associated with lower and middle status
work in less prestigious firms."). See generally SusAN FALuI, BACKLASH: THE
UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERicAN WOMEN 363-99 (1991) (citing numerous
statistics of the current, discouraging situation of women within the American
work force).
Indeed, there is every indication that discriminatory forces are still operating in Minnesota work places. See, e.g., Bob von Sternberg, Women, Minorities
Mostly at Bottom of Metro Job Market, STAR Tam. (Mpls.), Dec. 6, 1992, at 1A
(reporting the results of a Minnesota census as showing that, "[wiomen and
minorities in the Twin Cities have made considerably less headway in cracking
several employment bastions traditionally held by white men than they have in
the nation as a whole"); Richard Chin, Women Secured Job Gains in '80s, Large
Number Move Up to Management Ranks, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 15,
1992, at 1A (reporting a study of Minnesota women in the work force as showing that "[miany traditionally female jobs-secretaries, telephone operators, elementary school teachers-still are dominated by women. And women have
made only small inroads into some traditionally male jobs .... What is more,
even where the gains were made, they often were in the lower-paying end ofjob
categories."); Donna Halvorsen, Women Lawyers PaidLess, Face Job Discrimination, Study Says, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Oct. 27, 1989, at B7 ("[Al study commissioned by Minnesota Women Lawyers raises important questions about
whether the recent influx of women law graduates is being assimilated into the
profession.").
70. Social scientists call this phenomena "occupational segregation," distinguishing it from the "hierarchical segregation" that operates to confine women
to lower jobs within an occupation. In America, certain occupations are clearly
segregated by sex; for example, 96% of all electrical and electronic engineers are
male. See BRADLEY, supra note 3, at 17. Bradley cites other statistics: "In
traditional blue-collar areas women are particularly poorly represented, being
in 1982 less than 2 per cent of carpenters, masons, plumbers, electricians, truck
drivers and automobile mechanics." Id. By contrast, "in the early 1980s [women] were 99 percent of typists, secretaries and telephone operators, 97 per
cent of household service workers, [and] 94 per cent of keypunchers." Id. See
also Lyon, supra note 68, at 161 ("Women and men are still largely concentrated in different industries and occupations-those most compatible with
traditional notions of sex-appropriate work."); BLAU & FERBER, supra note 3, at
160, 167 (charting the percentage of female workers in selected professional
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claims contesting hiring decisions, and more claims challenging
promotion and partnership decisions. 7 1 Upper level employment decision-making processes are more complex than hiring
procedures because they almost always include an extensive
subjective evaluation of the employee's qualifications and personality.7 2 Such evaluations are inherently prone to the use of
gender stereotypes. 73 Predictably, then, as the percentage of
discrimination claims challenging upper level decisions increases, judges encounter more stereotyping issues in the
courtroom.
Additionally, women's progress toward equal opportunity in
employment and increased legal regulation of employment decisions have heightened employer awareness of discrimination
since the 1960s and '70s. 74 The presence of women at work and
occupations); LnDA L. LI-DsEY, GENDER ROLEs: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
187-89 (1990) (discussing the "occupational distribution of women").
One particularly harmful consequence of occupational segregation is that
the jobs largely performed by men uniformly pay better than jobs largely performed by women, even when both jobs require comparable skill and education.
See ANDERSEN, supra note 3, at 115, 117 ("[Women are most heavily concentrated in those jobs that have been the most devalued-both economically and
socially.... [O]ccupations most populated by women workers are the lowest
paid of all occupations."). In 1990, women employed full time and year round
earned only 71% of salaries earned by men employed full time and year round.
Id. at 101. Andersen goes on to note that "[w]omen college graduates, on the
average, earned the equivalent of men with only a high school education." Id.
See generally LINDsEY, supra, at 189-90 (discussing and charting the "wage
gap" between men and women).
71. See Cava, supra note 64, at 55 (describing the "second generation" of
employment discrimination law suits).
72. See Radford, supra note 3, at 484 ("[A]s women attempt to rise to positions of power, a new set of evaluation standards, based on intangible personal
assets, is applied. When looking for leaders... decision makers search for more
than just physical ability or technical competence. Personal attributes take on
prime importance."); Cava, supra note 64, at 55 (noting that upper level evaluation focuses on personality and the "over-all picture of the person").
73. See The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. REv.
340, 345 (1989) ("[When] employment decisions [are]... subjective rather than
objective... ambiguous criteria for success often lead to the evaluation of a
candidate based on personal impressions. As a result, these procedures are
particularly vulnerable to the influence of gender bias through sex-role stereotyping."); Radford, supra note 3, at 474 ("The question... [is] whether females
suffer disproportionately from this evaluative device, which, although neutral
on its face, is affected profoundly by preconceived notions of the 'appropriate'
roles and traits of women and men."); Eson, supra note 2, at 848-49 ("Evaluations that are subjective are more likely to be tainted by... male bias because
they reveal the evaluator's unreflective perceptions of the employee's performance-perceptions that cannot be reduced to a standardized measure.").
74. See RHODE, supra note 5, at 168 ("Before passage of antidiscrimination
legislation in the early 1960s, many employers were surprisingly public about
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costly gender discrimination suits are just two circumstances
employers did not face a few decades ago. 7 5 Consequently, today's employers couch discriminatory treatment of all kinds in
subtle terms. 76 Rather than citing gender as a factor in an employment decision, an employer describes the employee's failure
to meet subjective job qualifications, or a particular personality
77
problem, as grounds for a negative evaluation.
Finally, as women move into higher, more powerful positions, resistance against that movement intensifies. 78 The entry
of women into the top echelons of various fields is more threatening to male control 7 9 than their entry into low paying and low
prestige jobs.80 A largely male law firm is likely to resist a female partner more strenuously than a female law clerk, just as a
male dominated company is more likely to resist a female president than a female secretary."' Increased resistance means intheir private biases.... [However,] changing attitudes and statutory mandates
have made such overt discrimination increasingly rare.").
75. Id. Rhode describes the work world before the mid-1960s: "[S]ome job
advertisements openly specified 'males preferred,' and many workplaces had
separate job titles, pay scales, and promotion channels for men and women performing substantially the same work." Id.
76. William L. Kandel, Current Developments in Employment Litigation,

15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 101, 113 (1989) (commenting that employers are unlikely twenty-five years after the enactment of Title VII to allow courts to receive smoking gun evidence of gender discrimination).
77. Of course, employers who discriminate blatantly still surface. See, e.g.,
Walsdorfv. Board of Comm'rs, 857 F.2d 1047, 1053 (5th Cir. 1988) (examining a
witness's testimony that the defendant employer stated concerning the plaintiff's bid for a position, "ain't no bitch gonna get this job. My man's already
picked out and that's the way it's going to be," to which the court responded,
"[tihere may exist a more unequivocal way to express an intent to exclude women from consideration for a promotion, but none come readily to mind").
78. For an illuminating discussion of power, the advancement of women
into higher level positions, and increased male resistance, see Radford, supra
note 3, at 475-84.
79. Author Christine Littleton describes "male control" as "concentrated in
the hands of a few men who are at or near the top of intersecting hierarchies of
sex, race, and class .... " Christine A. Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1317 (1987).
80. Radford comments that the entrance of women into the "club of the
powerful" at the upper levels of professional employment "is not accomplished
as easily as was the movement by women into the workplace." Radford, supra
note 3, at 483. "Unlike entry-level positions, which pose no threat to those already in power, the promotion of women to positions involving prestige and influence is a direct threat to male decision makers. In other words, women do
not just want jobs-they want theirjobs." Id. at 484. See also Cava, supra note
64, at 55 (explaining that the enforcement of employment discrimination law is
becoming more difficult as employees begin to challenge "decision making by
professionals about professionals").
81. Radford, supra note 3, at 484.
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creased reliance on anything that weeds women out of
competition for such jobs, including gender stereotyping.8 2
Thus, this shift in the dynamics of the work world has made
stereotyping a common current form of discrimination against
female employees.

B. How

GENDER STEREOTYPING OPERATES AGAINST
PROFESSIONAL WOMEN: THE "DoUBLE BIND"

Employers stereotype women in two fundamental ways.8 3
82. Id.
83. For a general discussion of stereotyping, see Radford, supra note 3, at
489 (describing the two-step stereotyping process of categorizing people into
groups and then attributing certain traits to the groups). A 1972 study of traits
attributed to the two sexes is revealing:
In what has been referred to as the "definitive work on sex-role stereotypes," Broverman measured the degree to which various personality
traits were perceived as typical of men or of women. Adjectives that
consistently were viewed as describing "male" traits included the following aggressive, independent, unemotional, objective, not easily influenced, dominant, calm, active, competitive, logical, worldly, skilled
in business, direct, adventurous, self-confident, ambitious. Adjectives
representing "female" traits included: talkative, does not use harsh
language, tactful, gentle, aware of other's feelings, religious, neat,
quiet, easily expresses tender feelings, very strong need for security.
Id. at 494 (citing Inge K. Broverman et al., Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Current
Appraisal,28 J. Soc. IssuEs 59 (1972)). See also SusAN T. FIsKE & SHELLEY E.
TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 53-55 (1984) ("That stereotypes of men are more
positive than those of women is unquestionably true. Stereotypically, men are
active, independent, competitive, and ambitious, while women are passive, dependent, intuitive, and uncompetitive."). Dr. Fiske testified as an expert witness on stereotyping before the United States Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
These researchers put the different traits associated with men and women
in an employment context:
Judged on the basis of statements employers themselves make... beliefs regarding differences in average ability or behavior by sex are
quite common. For example, in one study male managers and administrators compared men and women with respect to a variety of traits
that are likely to be related to productivity. Men as a group were rated
more highly on understanding the "big picture," of the organization;
approaching problems rationally; getting people to work together; understanding financial matters; sizing up situations accurately; administrative capability; leadership potential; setting long-range goals and
working toward them; wanting to get ahead; standing up under fire;
keeping cool in emergencies; independence and self-sufficiency; and aggressiveness. Women [were rated] more highly on clerical aptitude; being good at detail work; and enjoyment of routine tasks.
BLAu & FERBER, supra note 3, at 252. One researcher made an even more startling discovery in a study of how the sex of a job applicant interacts with that
applicant's ability in affecting employer judgments of occupational suitability:
"[R]emarkabl[y,]... the sex-appropriateness variable was much more powerful
than the qualifications variable; poorly qualified people of one sex were judged
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In the first type of stereotyping, an employer evaluates or criticizes an employee based on the employee's gender.84 For example, an employer demotes an employee for unacceptable
"abrasiveness," 5 but closer examination reveals that the employee is not "abrasive" as an objective matter, but is abrasive
"for a woman."8 6 Differing standards of "acceptable" work conduct for men and women constitute disparate treatment if adverse consequences attach to female employees' failure to meet
the stricter female standard.8 7 Put differently, when behavior is
tolerable or admirable when displayed by male employees, but
unacceptable when displayed by female employees, the employer
is discriminating through "disparate evaluation" stereotyping.8 8
In the second kind of stereotyping, employers impose discriminatory employment criteria upon employees based on stereotyped notions about the demands of the job.8 9 An employer
more suitable for same-sex occupations than highly qualified persons of the
other sex." WILLIAMs & BEST, supra note 10, at 294 (describing results of a
1980 study by American researcher Kalin).
84. See generally Radford, supra note 3, at 499-501 (describing the stereotyping of "masculine" women in the work place).
85. Abrasiveness and aggressiveness are personality traits that often surface in "disparate evaluation" stereotyping. See id.; see also, e.g., Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234 (1989) (describing the employer accounting firm's evaluation of the employee: "[Oin too many occasions, however,
Hopkins' aggressiveness apparently spilled over into abrasiveness.... [The
evaluating partners indicated] that she was sometimes overly aggressive and
unduly harsh.").
86. See Radford, supra note 3, at 501 (noting that "even when men and
women engage in the same power strategies, women using these strategies are
viewed as... less likeable than the men").
87. Stereotyping of this type usually occurs when the employer cites, as its
proffered reason for demoting or not hiring a female employee, personality
traits traditionally considered "masculine." See Eson, supra note 2, at 845
("[Aggression, like other characteristics attributed to males, is negatively evaluated when displayed by women."); Heather K Gerken, UnderstandingMixed
Motives Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Analysis of Intentional
DiscriminationClaimsBased on Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions, 91 MICH.

L. REV. 1824, 1827 (1993) ("[Wlomen who exhibit the masculine characteristics
traditionally associated with success suffer the effects of sex stereotyping because employers tend to perceive women negatively when they do not conform
to feminine stereotypes."); Radford, supra note 3, at 501 ("[Wlomen who use
power strategies typically associated with [men] may be deemed to be engaging
in a type of behavior which is 'unnatural.'").
88. See generally FIsxE & TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 53-55 ("When a man
and a woman perform exactly the same behavior, a man's performance may be
evaluated more favorably than a woman's.").
89. Many employers, for example, unreasonably believe that certain jobs
demand certain character traits more predominant in men. See Eichner, supra
note 8, at 1398-99 ("[Jlob descriptions... that have been adapted to male incumbents continue to bar women from those sectors of the labor market from
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using this form of stereotyping harbors unrealistically narrow or
biased standards for effective job performance that exclude women from those jobs. 90 For example, an employer refuses an employee's promotion bid, finding her "too emotional" for a high
level position, but the employer's assessment is not relevant to
the demands of the job.9 1 Rather, the "stoicism" requirement is
rooted in gender bias existing in the employer's thought process:
men have performed this job in the past, men are stoic, therefore
92
this job requires stoicism.
"Disparate criteria" discrimination is difficult for female employees to prove in court because the employer applies the same
job requirements to its male and female employees, creating the
illusion of equal treatment on the job.9 3 Because all the "necessary"94 criteria are "masculine,"95 however, many more women
which they were once historically excluded by intentional discrimination.");
Radford, supra note 3, at 479 ("'[F]emale' or 'feminine' roles and traits are usually the antithesis of the traits thought related to success and effectiveness.");
Gerken, supra note 87, at 1824 ("Sex-stereotyped notions of achievement cause
employers to define success in masculine terms and to undervalue women's accomplishments."); see also id. ("Anything that heightens an employer's awareness of a worker's femininity may adversely affect the employer's evaluation of
her performance because it highlights the differences between her identity and
the masculine qualities traditionally associated with success."). As one researcher succinctly stated: "women do not fit the managerial stereotype."
Lyon, supra note 68, at 174.
90. See Eson, supra note 2, at 846 (listing typical "masculine" traits that
most employers uniformly demand of upper level professionals: "persistence
and drive, personal dedication, aggressiveness, emotional detachment, and a
kind of sexless matter-of-factness equated with intellectual performance").
91. One author notes how common this is:
Many jobs in today's labor market require traits ... generally associated with men. Although such job demands typically are perceived as
necessary for optimal job performance, often they are unconnected to
the actual needs of the job itself. Instead, these requirements are
based on the faulty supposition that the job must be performed as it
has always been performed ....
Eichner, supra note 8, at 1401. As one successful businesswoman's employer
allegedly phrased this stereotype-based demand for masculine behavior from
female employees: "'I'm not going to pay you like a broad, and I'm not going to
treat you like a broad, so don't act like a broad.'" Jane Gross, Against the Odds:
A Woman's Ascent on Wall Street, N.Y. TmEs MAG., Jan. 6, 1985, at 16. The
employer seems not to have entertained the possibility that a woman might be
paid and treated like male employees without acting like them.
92. See Eichner, supra note 8, at 1401.
93. For an excellent discussion of the difficulty women have making courts
acknowledge this kind of gender discrimination, see CAHRINE A. MACKiNNON,
TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF Tr= STATE 215-34 (1989).
94. Studies show that currently required "masculine" traits are, in fact, not
at all "necessary" for the performance of traditionally male jobs. See SAMUEL
CoN, THE PROCESS OF OCCUPATIONAL SEx-TYPING: THE FEMINIZATION OF CLER-
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than men are excluded under the employer's evaluation
96
process.
The two breeds of stereotyping do not occur independently.
Their operation is simultaneous, and traps professional women
in a double bind.9 7 Female employees who display a personality
matching gender stereotypes of women are perceived to be "too
feminine" for the job under "disparate criteria" stereotyping, and
those who display a personality matching male stereotypes are
considered "too masculine" for employer tastes under "disparate
evaluation" stereotyping.9 8 The Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse illustrates this trap, using the specific trait of aggressiveness: "An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an
intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not."9 9
BmRTAIN 13-16 (1985); see also Eichner, supra note 8, at
1402 ("As sociologists have long recognized... sex-typed traits commonly associated with a job often have little inherent connection with performance; instead, the perception that a job requires masculine traits typically derives from
associating the job with its incumbents.").
95. This description of a successful female business school dean which appeared in the New York Times in 1984, is revealing: "Mrs. Bailey, a short,
stocky, 45-year-old woman with a firm chin and a determined expression is
pushing the Pittsburgh-based school into the middle of the computer age." Kirk
Johnson, Technology's Dean: ElizabethE.Bailey;A Computer Whiz at the Helm
of Carnegie-Mellon,N.Y. Tinds, Aug. 26, 1984, at C5. The reporter's extremely
masculine description of Elizabeth Bailey's personality and appearance seems
intended to legitimize her as a "real player" in the male-dominated business
world.
96. Maxine Eichner describes this phenomenon as a "vicious cycle for many
women" because "[when] employers fail to hire women who cannot or will not
adopt 'male' standards of behavior[, mien continue to dominate th[olse positions, which, in turn, continue to be viewed as male and adapted to men."
Eichner, supra note 8, at 1404.
97. See Radford, supra note 3, at 502 ("[Numerous studies have shown
that even though 'feminine' management styles are deemed weaker and inadequate, women who are perceived as using 'masculine' management styles are,
at best, deemed ineffective and, at worst, resented and viewed as overbearing.").
The Supreme Court sums up the interaction between the two forms of stereotyping as follows: "In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must
not be, has acted on the basis of gender." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
98. Rhode describes the double bind: "[Women] who conform to traditional
definitions of femininity have often appeared lacking in the assertiveness necessary for occupational success, while those who conform to masculine models
have appeared bitchy, aggressive, or difficult to work with." RHODE, supra note
5, at 167.
99. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. Against this powerful combination
of stereotype-infused forces, working women often have little or no chance to
ICAL LABOR iN GREAT
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THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF MINNESOTA'S McDoAWNzL
DouGLAS FRAMwoRK IN STEREOTYPE CASES

Despite the societal changes in the work force described earlier that have made stereotyping the predominant form of employment discrimination,1 0 0 Minnesota courts continue to use a
disparate treatment employment discrimination framework that
makes no reference to stereotyping'O' and was not created for
stereotype cases. Under McDonnell Douglas, the disparate
treatment plaintiff may choose between two strategies. She may
attempt to prove either that "the reason advanced by [her employer] was 'pretextual'" or that "[a] 'discriminatory reason'
more likely than not motivated [the employer's decision]." 0 2
Neither option, unaided, lends itself to a theoretically synthesized discussion of stereotype issues. To be effective, the law's
prohibition of stereotyping cannot be "interpreted into" a twenty

year old framework; it must be explicit and specific.
1.

The McDonnell Douglas Pretext Challenge: Semantically
Misleading in Stereotype Cases

The employee's first option under McDonnell Douglas,
showing that any legitimate motives proffered by her employer
are "pretextual,"10 3 cannot accommodate a meaningful inquiry
into stereotype issues. The pretext challenge becomes awkward
in stereotyping cases because it does not allow the plaintiff to
rise to the top levels of male dominated professions. "Stereotyping... creates
barriers to women's advancement in the work place, both by limiting a woman's
achievements and by tainting an employer's evaluation of those accomplishments." Gerken, supra note 87, at 1827. The majority remain pooled in low or
perhaps middle level careers, excluded from higher paying, more prestigious
employment. See SEAGER & OLsON, supra note 66, at 18 (offering research that
in the United States a vast majority of women who work outside the home work
in the job "ghettos" of low level teaching, sales, nursing, child care, or bank
telling); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1163, 1189 (1988) ("[Sex stereotyping] entrench[es] gender hierarchies.");
Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of
Employment Discrimination,21 B.C. L. REv. 345, 349 (1980) ("[Sex stereotyping constitutes] a primary obstacle to equal employment opportunity.").
100. See supra part IIA (discussing these changes).
101. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (containing
the Minnesota framework).
102. Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 627
(Minn. 1988) (en banc); see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (explaining McDonnell Douglas's two options).
103. See supra notes 37, 39 and accompanying text (discussing the pretext
challenge).
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challenge the legitimacy, as opposed to the truth, of an employer
motive allegedly affected by gender bias.
The option of challenging employer statements as pretextual invites the plaintiff to contest the truth of defendants' proffered motives. 10 4 This challenge will succeed only if an
employer's motive is not true, that is, if it is an intentional
"cover up" for a discriminatory motive.' 0 5 In a stereotype case,
however, the plaintiff contests not the truth of the employer's
motive, but the legitimacy of the motive. The stereotype plaintiff concedes that the employer did not fabricate a motive, or
that the motive as articulated by the employer is its "real" motive, but argues that the motive is discriminatory because it is
based on stereotyping.
The distinction between contesting the truth of an employer's motive, as the plaintiff does in a pretext challenge, and
contesting the legitimacy of the motive is a subtle but important
one.' 0 6 On the surface, it seems as if stereotype cases could be
litigated under a pretext analysis. The plaintiff in a stereotype
case could use her evidence to show that her employer was "really" motivated by gender bias, using the language of the pretext
framework.' 0 7 The plaintiff's claim, however, would inevitably
suffer because the precise challenge in a stereotype case is not
that the employer was "really" motivated by something else, it is
104. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)
(stating that under the "pretext" challenge: "[plaintiff must] show[ ] that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence").
105. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805 ("[O]n the retrial respondent must
be given a[nl... opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the
presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a...
discriminatory decision.").
106. See generally Eileen M. Fields, 1985-1986 Annual Survey of LaborRelations and Employment DiscriminationLaw, 28 B.C. L. Rav. 170, 176-81
(1986) (discussing the shortcomings of the McDonnell Douglas "pretext" analysis in stereotype cases). A plaintiff makes a "pretext" attack, or disputes the
truth of an employer's motive, when she argues that the employer was not really motivated by its proffered motivation. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
805. The "pretext" challenge implies that if the employer had been motivated
by its proffered reason, its decision would not have been discriminatory. Id.
Thus, in a pretext challenge, the reason challenged is itself legitimate; the illegitimacy of the decision stems from the employer's use of the reason as a
coverup.
In a stereotype case, the employee does not dispute whether the employer
was "actually motivated" by its proffered reason. Rather, the employee agrees
that the motive articulated by the employer led to its decision. The employee
introduces evidence, however, that the motive itself is based on stereotyping
and therefore discriminatory.
107. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 (plaintiff in a "pretext" case
shows that employer's explanation is unworthy of credence).
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that the employer's motive "really" is gender bias.' 0 8 In the
words of the Supreme Court, "it simply makes no sense to ask,"
in stereotype cases, whether the reason actually relied on by the
employer was its "true reason."10 9 Requiring her to twist her
evidence into the malfitting "pretext" language distorts crucial
elements of the stereotype plaintiff's claim. Thus, the McDonnell Douglas "pretext" challenge is not an effective legal platform for stereotype cases.
2.

The Existing but Weak Option of Proving Discrimination
Directly in Stereotype Cases

Although she cannot present her evidence within a pretext
challenge, the gender stereotype plaintiff may introduce that evidence as part of a direct showing that discrimination "more
likely than not motivated" her employer's decision. 110 The Minnesota Supreme Court articulates this second option under McDonnell Douglas in terms so broad as to permit, presumably, the
introduction of stereotype evidence in disparate treatment
claims."'1
Yet, simply because the second alternative of McDonnell
Douglas does not entirely preclude the introduction of stereotyping evidence does not mean that this "catch-all" option is capable
of the kind of specific analysis necessary to examine complex
stereotyping issues. 1 12 Stereotyping is a difficult, developing,
1 13
and controversial breed of employment discrimination.
Under these circumstances, plaintiffs and their lawyers are un108. In stereotype cases, the employer's proffered motive and the alleged
gender bias are one entity, one is not a "pretext" for the other. It is illogical to
accuse an employer who has admitted to an arguably illegitimate motive of using that motive as a "pretext" or coverup.
109. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989) (describing the
limits of McDonnell Douglas).
110. Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 627
(Minn. 1988) (en banc). See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (explaining that under MDonnell Douglas the plaintiff's second option is to "directly" persuade the court of discrimination).
111. McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993) (en
bane) (explaining that even if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate pretext, "[she] may
nevertheless prevail if an illegitimate reason 'more likely than not' motivated
the discharge decision") (citing Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 627).
112. The dearth of plaintiffs filing stereotype cases in Minnesota seems to
indicate this inadequacy. See GENDER FAnmNss REPORT, supra note 14, at 81
(hypothesizing about the "reluctance of [Minnesota] victims to seek legal redress" in gender discrimination cases).
113. See generally supra part HA-B (discussing stereotyping).
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derstandably hesitant to litigate their claims 1 1 4 unless the law
explicitly addresses and prohibits stereotyping in the work
place. The direct method of proof under McDonnell Douglas
merely invites the plaintiff to show that discrimination "more
likely than not" motivated her employer; it does not contain a
specific prohibition against stereotyping, or any language about
stereotyping whatsoever." 5 The absence of such language
weakens the effectiveness of Minnesota's framework in the
many instances of employment discrimination in which gender
stereotyping is the predominant or sole issue. In sum, neither
option of McDonnell Douglas adequately serves stereotype
plaintiffs.
D.

PPrcE WATERHOUSz.

NOT

A SATISFYING OPTION

Even though Price Waterhouse is considered a "stereotype
case,"1 1 6 adopting a Price Waterhouse framework in addition to,
or instead of, the McDonnell Douglas framework would not
greatly advance Minnesota's approach to stereotyping cases.
The Price Waterhouse Court's definition of gender stereotyping
greatly underestimates the wide range of employer decision
making infected with gender stereotypes.
Price Waterhouse's analysis focuses on causation, on the
amount of stereotyping that will be tolerated before an employment decision will be deemed illegal. 117 It deemphasizes the
114. See generally GENDER FAIRNEss REPORT, supra note 14, at 80-84 (discussing various problems Minnesota victims of employment discrimination face
in bringing and winning claims). In fact, victim reluctance to bring discrimination cases is a nationwide problem. See BARBARA A. CuRREN, THE LEGAL NEEDS
OF THE PUBLIC 137 (1977) (reporting a national survey by the American Bar
Association and American Bar Foundation revealing that two thirds of the
United States citizens who experience employment discrimination do nothing
about it). See generally Kristen Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A
Critique of the Model of Legal Protection, 12 SiGNs 421 (1987) (discussing women's reluctance to pursue discrimination cases).
115. See Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623-24 (describing the direct method of
proof option under McDonnell Douglas).
116. See Bach, supra note 47, at 1264; see also supra note 52 (describing the
critical reception of Price Waterhouse).
117. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (stating the holding of
the case). In fact, many courts outside Minnesota that have addressed stereotyping, both state and federal, have focused on articulating guidelines for determining how much stereotyping must taint an employment decision before
the employer is liable, rather than on a definition of the term "stereotyping"
itself. See generally Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination
Law, 34 WAYNE L. Ruv. 1235, 1237-38 (1988) ("[Causation] tests [articulated by
courts] require that the party with the burden of proof on causation prove that
the unlawful discrimination was either 'a factor,' 'a motivating factor,' the or a
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root problem of defining illegal stereotyping itself."-" Furthermore, when the opinion does turn to identifying, rather than
quantifying, stereotyping, it fails to recognize all but the most
blatant examples of stereotyping at work in employer decisions. 11 9 Worse, the Court also comments that identifying the
stereotyping in Hopkins' claim was easy, opining that "[lit takes
no special training to discern sex stereotyping" of the kind perpetrated against Ann Hopkins. 120 The message of Price
determinative factor,' 'a substantial factor,' 'a significant factor,' 'a discernible
factor,' or the 'but for' cause."); Mark S. Brodin, The Standardof Causation in
the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L.

REv. 292 (1982) (weighing the benefits of various standards). For two compelling discussions of causation issues specific to stereotype cases, see Sam
Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination,Mixed Motives, and the Inner
Boundary of DiscriminationLaw, 35 BUFF. L. Rav. 85, 151-61 (1986) (arguing

that "language discrimination" or stereotyping should be illegal even if it is not
determinative of a certain adverse employment decision); Struth, supra note 7,
at 708 ("Since quantifying the degree to which sexual stereotyping had an effect
on the employment decision is an impracticable task, a violation... is certainly
made out when the employee proves that the stereotyping was relied upon in
reaching the adverse employment decision.").
118. "[T]he [Price Waterhouse] Court does not clearly address what constitutes stereotyping." Cava, supra note 64, at 53.
119. The Court attempts to draw a line between legal decision making and
illegal stereotyping, but that line merely separates the statement "Hopkins is
too macho" from the statement "Hopkins is too aggressive." The Court slips by
not recognizing that the difference between such statements is semantic and
superficial. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35 (categorizing adjectives
used by employers such as "macho" and "masculine" as indications of stereotyping, but adjectives such as "aggressive," "abrasive," "brusque," "harsh," and "difficult" as legitimate, negative evaluations of Hopkins). See also Radford, supra
note 3, at 526-27 (describing as a "flaw" in PriceWaterhouse the Court's failure
to recognize that evaluations "of an individual's 'interpersonal skills' like the
evaluation made of Hopkins are "exactly the type ofjudgement prone to stereotyped conclusions"); Eson, supra note 2, at 838-39, 850-51 (discussing the
Supreme Courts failure to address subtle forms of gender discrimination). According to Eson, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse affirmed the district
court's findings that:
Price Waterhouse legitimately emphasized interpersonal skills in its
partnership decision, an area in which Hopkins received harsh criticism.... The court had little difficulty acknowledging... that remarks

characterizing Hopkins as.. . "overcompensating for being a woman"
were tainted by sex stereotyping.... Yet for all the Court's ability to

recognize the more obvious sex stereotyping in the evaluation process,
it failed to reach the more subtle discrimination that tainted the assessment of Hopkins' personality. The Court unquestioningly accepted
the firm's harsh evaluation of Hopkins' personality... without further
examining the employment context in which the appraisal was made.
Id.

120. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256. The Court goes on to say:
[E]xpert testimony [on issues involved in gender stereotyping] was
merely icing on Hopkins' cake.... [It does not] require expertise in
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Waterhouse is that gender stereotyping is both blatant
and eas12 1
ily recognized. In fact, it is rarely either of these.
Because Price Waterhouse fails to identify and prohibit all
forms of gender discrimination based on stereotyping, both subtle and overt, its adaptation would not advance Minnesota disparate treatment jurisprudence as far as necessary. 12 2 Because
it implies that judges can and do easily spot gender stereotyping
in discrimination claims, it presents a danger to Minnesota
courtrooms. 123 Thus, Price Waterhouse is not a solution to MAin-

nesota's need for law that addresses stereotyping.

E.

BIGGER THAN THE FRAMEWORKS: OTHER WEAKNESSES OF
DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW IN STEREOTYPE CASES

1. Judicial Insensitivity to Gender Stereotyping
Gender stereotyping in employment discrimination is extremely burdensome to prove in litigation, in part because evidence of stereotyping is sensitive, subjective in form, and easily
denied by employers.' 24 In light of these complexities, courts
must not assume, like the Price Waterhouse Court did, that stereotype-based bias in employment discrimination claims will be
obvious or easily identifiable. 12 5 Not only do judges sometimes
psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed "interpersonal skills"
can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps
it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn
the criticism.
Id.

121. Indeed, commentators stress that evidence of stereotyping like that
presented by Hopkins is extremely rare. See, e.g., Kandel, supra note 76, at
101, 113 ("[Price Waterhouse) relates to those few cases that present 'smoking
gun' evidence of employment discrimination.... Twenty-five years after the
enactment of Title VII, it is hard to conceive of employers offering plaintiffs and
courts the opportunity to decide [a second case like Price Waterhouse].").
122. Because Price Waterhouse is ultimately ineffective in stereotype cases,
the proposition that Minnesota plaintiffs have the option of bringing their disparate treatment claims in federal rather than state court is weak justification
for preserving the current state of Minnesota's law. See Cava, supra note 64, at
53 (arguing that Price Waterhouse fails to demonstrate "how those subject to
[gender stereotyping at work] can prove its effect" in court).
123. Judges must be more, not less, careful about recognizing stereotyping
in employer decisions. See infra part H.E.1.
124. See GENDER FAmness REPORT, supranote 14, at 82 (discussing gender
discrimination claims in general and stating that, "about half the judges [in
Minnesota] agree that these claims are more difficult to prove than other civil
cases. Employment discrimination cases are complex and frequently turn on
the credibility of one person.").
125. Unfortunately, many courts do take the identification of stereotyping
for granted. "Court opinions use the word [stereotyping] without defining it."
Cava, supra note 64, at 28. "While neither explicitly stating it, courts appear to
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fail to recognize gender stereotyping in such claims, 126 often the
judges themselves use stereotypes against female litigators and
parties in their courtrooms. 127 If some judges are unaware of
their own biases, or unconcerned about those biases, they may
not sensitively identify and condemn similar biases in employers. 128 Explicit, proscriptive legal language addressing this istreat stereotyping as something 'so commonly known in the community as to
make it unprofitable io require proof, and so certainly known as to make it indisputable among reasonable men.'" Id. at 40 (quoting McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE 992 (E. Cleary ed., 1984)). Cava continues, "Courts have never studied
and mastered the issue, nor devoted energy to understanding the large psychological and sociological implications of stereotyping. Rather, the operative measure for handling stereotyping claims seems to be: We can't define it, but we
know it when we see it." Id. at 55. Cf Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 400
A.2d 1182, 1188-89 (N.J. 1979) (Handier, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("[Not everyone has a nose for discrimination, especially in its most subtle forms .... Discrimination often goes uncorrected because it is undetected.").
126. "[Tlhe hope that the courts ([ I currently male dominated) [will] even be
able to recognize sex stereotyping has been somewhat dim." Radford, supra
note 3, at 485 n.56. Radford's lament was prompted by the following passage
from a district court opinion explaining why a stereotype plaintiff should not
have a cause of action against the law firm refusing her partnership:
In a very real sense a professional partnership is like a marriage. It is,
in fact, nothing less than a "business marriage" for better or worse.
Just as in marriage different brides bring different qualities into the
union-some beauty, some money, and some character-so also in professional partnerships, new mates or partners are sought and betrothed for different reasons and to serve different needs of the
partnership. Some new partners bring legal skills, others bring clients. Still others bring personality and negotiating skills. In both,
new mates are expected to bring not only ability and industry, but also
moral character, fidelity, trustworthiness, loyalty, personality and
love. Unfortunately, however, in partnerships, as in matrimony, these
needed, worthy and desirable qualities are not necessarily divided
evenly among the applicants according to race, age, sex or religion, and
in some they just are not present at all.
Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Employment Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1303, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 1980)).
127. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Studying GenderBias in the Courts:
Stories and Statistics, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2187 (1993); Deborah Ruble Round,
Note, Gender Bias in the Judicial System, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2193 (1988).
128. Indeed, the laws seeming inability to affect the sluggish progress of
women to the top levels of most professional fields, see supra note 69, indicates
that perhaps judges and juries are not correctly identifying and proscribing
stereotyping when it surfaces in discrimination claims. See Round, supra note
127, at 2194 ("Gender bias must be eliminated in the judicial system not only
because it influences the perception of women in the courtroom, but also because it undermines the manner in which courts apply the law and thus affects
the substantive rights of the litigants."). See also Radford, supra note 3, at 534
("[Sex stereotypes] are so deeply entrenched that the judicial system... ha[s]
not yet appreciated their most insidious forms.").
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sue would aid discrimination plaintiffs by sharpening judicial
perception in stereotype claims.
2.

The "Intent Requirement" Problem

The stereotype plaintiff who brings her case as a disparate
treatment claim must prove that her employer acted with discriminatory intent. 12 9 Courts have updated the intent requirement to keep pace with more sophisticated employer motives;
unfortunately, that evolution has not been toward a definition of
"intent" helpful to stereotype plaintiffs. Courts recognized that
discrimination may be one of several motives in an illegal emdecision, a recognition that aids "mixed motive" plainployment
tiffs. 13 0 Courts have not, however, recognized that employers
often consciously or unconsciouslyl3 1 allow discrimination to
taint an employment decision, and that such decisions should
also be illegal. Without the second recognition, stereotype plainto meet the disparate treatment intent
tiffs often fail
32
requirement.'
Currently, courts hesitate to hold employers liable for stereotyping that is not overt, finding that employers may not have
"intended" subtle discrimination. This hesitancy confuses "intent" with "consciousness."13 3 Employers may intend to hold a
129. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977); see RoTHSTIN,supra note 24, at 234.
130. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1989) (establishing the federal "mixed motive" analysis); see also supra note 62 (citing
states that have adopted the Price Waterhouse "mixed motive" framework).
131. For an excellent discussion of the difference between "intene' and "consciousness7 in disparate treatment cases, see Fields, supra note 106, at 177-81.
132. "Because discrimination through sex role stereotyping may not take
the form of overtly sex-biased statements, but rather of 'neutral' criticism of a
woman's job performance, a plaintiff may be unable to demonstrate the causal
role played by the illegitimate motives... despite the prevalence of this type of
gender discrimination." The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, supra note 73, at 34850 (citations omitted).
133. Fields uses the Price Waterhouse facts to make this point:
[T]he [C]ourt was incorrect in concluding that... unconscious sexual
stereotyping by the evaluators was not sufficient to establish discriminatory motive.... In [Price Waterhouse], regardless of whether the
partners were "conscious" that their comments resulted from stereotypical assumptions, the partners "intended" to judge the plaintiff in
terms of appropriate "feminine" behavior.
Fields, supra note 106, at 179 (analyzing the district court decision in Price
Waterhouse). See also RHODE, supra note 5, at 162 ("Too much concern [in employment discrimination law] has focused on the conscious motivations of decision makers and too little on the cumulative disadvantages that their actions
impose."). Unconscious sexism is no more comforting to women than intentional sexism.
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female employee to stereotypical notions of femininity without
realizing that such behavior is discriminatory. 3 4 As author Eileen Fields states, "basing employment decisions on... stereotyping, whether conscious or unconscious, clearly constitutes
disparate treatment, since women employees are being judged
on the basis of their sex, rather than on the basis of individual
merit."' 3 5

Defining gender stereotyping in the law would assist stereotype plaintiffs to hurdle the "intent" obstacle. An official, specific definition of stereotyping would undermine the credibility of
employers who claim to be unaware that certain notions applied
to female employees are stereotypical. 1 3 6 Employers would be
forced to scrutinize their decision making for conscious and la1 37
tent gender bias, and to reject both.
III. LEGISLATIVELY DEFINING GENDER

STEREOTYPING: SUGGESTIONS FOR AN
EFFECTIVE STATUTE

Ironically, as long as the inadequate McDonnell Douglas
framework regarding stereotyping discourages stereotype plaintiffs from bringing claims,'13 the Minnesota Supreme Court will
be unable to articulate an effective definition of illegal stereotyping. Courts may only create or articulate law based on the facts
of cases before them. Thus, the shortage of plaintiffs filing stereWomen know that much if not most sexism is unconscious, heedless,
patronizing, well-meant, or profit-motivated. It is no less denigrating,
damaging, or sex-specific for not being "on purpose."... Yet, not knowing that one has sexist attitudes, or not knowing that they are influencing one's judgments, is legally taken as a reason that sex
discrimination did not occur.
MACKINNON, supra note 93, at 230.

134. Fields, supra note 106, at 179.
135. Id.
136. Author Alfred W. Blumrosen, grown weary of employer ignorance of
discrimination twenty-five years after Title VII, writes: "The perception that
employment discrimination is a rarity, to be acknowledged only upon a showing
that would satisfy a skeptic from Mars with no knowledge of our history, is
unrealistic." Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 1026-27.
137. As federal courts have declared in interpreting Title VII, employment
discrimination law should be "[a] spur or catalyst which causes employers and
unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to
endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges" of discrimination.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (quoting United
States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
138. See supra part H.C.1-2 (discussing the weaknesses of McDonnell
Douglas).
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otype cases 139 makes an imminent judicial definition of illegal
stereotyping unlikely.
Instead' the legislature must act.140 Minnesota law makers
should create a legislative definition of illegal gender based stereotyping. Such a definition would encourage wary plaintiffs to
bring stereotype cases, warn employers that stereotype-based
discrimination is intolerable, and give judges guidance on stereotype issues in court. Most importantly, the statute would provide an official statement that gender based stereotyping
constitutes unlawful discrimination.
In defining stereotyping, the Minnesota legislature must be
specific. A statute that merely prohibits "gender stereotyping by
employers" without defining stereotyping in explicit terms will
provide courts with no greater guidance than they currently
have in recognizing stereotyping, and will afford plaintiffs little
security in the law's competence in this area. The language chosen must capture the varied dynamics and circumstances of gender stereotyping, so that courts will be able to recognize
stereotyping when it surfaces in the plaintiff's evidence. Finally, the statute must separately address "disparate evaluation" stereotyping and "disparate job criteria" stereotyping' 4 ' to
ensure that the two are not confused, nor one ignored, but also
so that both are specifically defined and proscribed.
A "disparate job criteria" stereotyping plaintiff should be
able to demonstrate stereotyping under the statute by meeting
two requirements. The statute should first require convincing
evidence that the plaintiff's employer had unreasonably narrow
standards of behavior or character for a particular employment
opportunity that were unrelated to her ability to perform the job
and that arose out of preconceptions based on the reality that
the job is usually or traditionally performed by male employees.
The statute should further require the plaintiff to show that
such unreasonable standards adversely influenced an employment decision concerning her.
139. See supra note 58 (discussing statistics on Minnesota employment discrimination claims).
140. Legislative action to correct or supplement case law has been an effective tool in employment discrimination law at the federal level. See, e.g., supra
note 46 (noting the effect of the 1991 Civil Rights Act on federal disparate treatment law). See generally Gould, supra note 52 (discussing congressional reac-

tion to the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse and other recent
employment discrimination cases); Sandra Hemeryck et al.,
Reconstruction,
Deconstruction and Legislative Response: The 1988 Supreme Court Term and
the Civil'Rights Act of 1990, 25 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 475 (1990) (same).

141. See supra part II.B.
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The statute should similarly set forth two requirements for
the "disparate evaluation" plaintiff, It should require her to
demonstrate that her employer made an evaluation of her behavior or character that a male employee displaying similar behavior or character would not have received. It should also
require her to show that the stereotyped evaluation influenced
14 2
the employer's decision.
If a discrimination plaintiff meets the statute's require142. This sample amendment to the "Unfair Discriminatory Practices Act"
of the Minnesota Human Rights Act incorporates the suggestions outlined in
part III:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice under section 363.03,
subd. 1(2)(a)-(c) of this chapter, for an employer to undertake any action which adversely affects an employee's employment status when at
least one of the following factors motivates the decision to take such
action:
Subdivision 1. Unreasonable standards or criteria. The employer
subjects a female employee to unreasonable standards of job performance or unnecessary job criteria that are unrelated to the employee's
ability to perform the reasonable duties of her position. Such illegal
standards or criteria include, but are not limited to, an employer's demand or expectation:
(a) That the employee display any personality traits or other qualifications not demanded by the position she holds, regardless of the
personality traits or qualifications displayed by past or other employees; or
(b) That the employee not display any trait, habit, or manner, the
manifestation of which is not detrimental to her performance of the
position she holds, regardless of the traits, habits or manners displayed or not displayed by past or other employees; or
(c) That the employee demonstrate commitment to her job by
working unreasonable hours, or by making herself available for travel
or particular work scheduling or extra-employment activities, when
such hours or availability or activity are not an essential requirement
of the position she holds, regardless of the schedule kept or availability
or participation of past or other employees.
Subdivision 2. Unreasonable disparate evaluation. The employer
disparately evaluates a female employee's qualifications or behavior or
personality if a male employee displaying similar qualifications, behavior, or personality traits would not be similarly evaluated. Such illegal
evaluations shall include, but not be limited to, evaluations that characterize a female employee as:
(a) Overly aggressive, authoritative, ruthless, or brisk when a
male employee displaying similar behavior or personality traits would
not be evaluated as overly aggressive, authoritative, ruthless, or brisk;
or
(b) Unacceptably unconcerned about her appearance, when a male
employee displaying similar concern for his appearance would not be
evaluated as unacceptably unconcerned with his appearance; or
(c) Unacceptably using unprofessional or offensive language,
when a male employee using similar language would not be evaluated
as unacceptably using unprofessional or offensive language; or
(d) Too unemotional, detached, cold, or undemonstrative when a
male employee displaying similar behavior or personality traits would
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ments for either "disparate job criteria" stereotyping or "disparate evaluation" stereotyping, the court should find that
impermissible consideration of gender in the form of gender
stereotyping influenced the employer's decision regarding the
plaintiff, and find the employer liable for employment discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
CONCLUSION
For too many years, this country has boasted the near extinction of openly manifested gender discrimination while generating deplorable statistics of women's advancement in
professional fields. A new wave of attack against employer perpetrated gender bias is overdue. A statute meeting the above
requirements would begin such an attack by equipping courts
with specific legal definitions with which to measure and frame
stereotype evidence. The statute would help close the widening
gap between the twenty-year-old language of McDonnell Douglas and the concrete, current struggles of working women
against much subtler forms of bias. It would move beyond the
deficient treatment of stereotyping in Price Waterhouse, sharpen
judicial analysis of stereotype claims, and help correct the misconstruction of the disparate treatment "intent" requirement of
stereotype cases, thereby repositioning Minnesota ahead of federal law in this important area of civil rights jurisprudence.
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